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EFFECT OF TRADE IN STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT SECTORS 
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT 
VICTORIA CUMMINGS 
ABSTRACT 
In the modern, globalized economy countries are becoming increasingly 
intertwined economically and this growing interdependence will have an impact 
on how foreign policy is conceived. My thesis analyzes the relationship between 
strategically significant trade and conflict by analyzing dyadic trade data between 
Russia and 31 countries from 1993 to 2009, specifically identifying trade in fuels 
such as oil and natural gas as strategically important resource trade. This 
research aims to contribute to the discussion on whether high levels of trade in 
strategically significant resources decreases the likelihood of conflict and build on 
existing literature on the effects of trade on international relations. To test this 
claim, my model employed several control variables ranging from contiguity to 
trade dependence and used logistic regression to analyze the relationships 
between variables. Analysis showed that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between fuel trade and conflict in the sample used. Additionally my 
model found evidence to suggest that contiguity and NATO membership both 
have significant effects on the likelihood of conflict in the region studied.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Increasing globalization in the past thirty or so years has led to a 
pronounced uptick in the amount of studies looking at the effects of numerous 
economic variables on conflict. The emphasis placed on economic development 
in developing countries and the high levels of international trade have made 
trade an influential variable around the world. US President Donald Trump made 
trade policies a hot button issue on the campaign trail and continues to pursue 
his objectives in office. One of Trump’s first acts as president was to withdraw 
from the Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP) which included 12 countries that make 
up roughly 40% of the world GDP1. With trade and trade deals becoming such a 
polarizing issue in American politics and throughout the world, research on the 
effects of trade are key. 
 My thesis looks at the effect of strategically significant trade on conflict to 
test whether the increased levels of trade in particular resources will lead to 
fewer conflicts between countries. I define strategically significant trade as trade 
in industries that the government in question, in this case the Russian 
government, considers to be a vital sector for either national security, the 
economy, or both. Separating out this key dimension from trade in general is an 
important step forward in the scholarship on trade’s effect on conflict. Finding the 
effects of strategically significant trade will have implications for our 
                                               
1 Bremmer, Ian. "A Guide to Major Trade Deals in the Era of Donald Trump." Time. November 17, 
2017. Accessed December 11, 2017 
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understanding of conflict and be useful for developing foreign policy with the aim 
of limiting interstate conflicts. Any effects, positive or negative, will contribute to 
the understanding of how trade will influence state behaviors and whether 
sanctions can change the behavior of leaders or even function as an appropriate 
punishment for leaders who engage in policies that the wider international 
community considers to be out of line.  
To this aim, the following research design will focus on the effects of 
Russian trade in strategically significant oil and gas on its likelihood of engaging 
in conflict with trading partners. The broad aim of this research is to be able to 
generalize the effects of dyadic trade relationships as the determinants of 
conflict. The data was gathered from 31 countries that have high levels of trade 
with Russia between the period of 1993 and 2009. This time period was chosen 
to avoid difficulties involving the changing economic structure after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union that may have had implications on how trade was viewed. 
The study would have benefited from extending the time frame past 2009, 
however limited access to more updated information made 2009 the last year 
possible to find reliable information for every country in the sample. Specifically 
this design uses data from sources including the Correlates of War Project, 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research to measure two levels of 
conflict between Russia and their trading partners in addition to trade data from 
various sources including the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and OEC (the 
Observatory of Economic Complexity). The stricter definition of conflict labeled 
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“MConflict” on the model uses only militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as 
defined by the Correlates of War project to signify conflict. The second conflict 
variable includes MIDs data, but also considers less severe forms of conflict such 
as sanctions, significant trade disputes, non-militarized border disputes, and 
cyber-attacks. The following models will test both definitions of conflict to 
determine if there are any differences between levels.  
Literature Review 
A key article on the topic of trade and conflict is “Assessing the Liberal 
Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict” by John R. 
Oneal and Bruce Russett2. Their main research questions aligned significantly 
with my research goals and provided a valuable starting point to build this thesis 
off of. Oneal and Russett look at whether economically important trade 
significantly reduces the probability of militarized disputes between countries. 
Their design tests the effects of economically important trade on conflict using 
logistic regression analysis of pooled cross-sectional time-series data3. The 
period of interest ranges from 1950 to 1992 and their research design focuses on 
pairs of major power countries that they deem to be “politically relevant” powers. 
Oneal and Russett find that there is no relationship between conflict and 
economic interdependence and explain their equation for defining economic 
                                               
2 Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict John 
R. Oneal Bruce Russett Vol 36, Issue 4, pp. 423 - 442 First Published July 1, 1999 
3 Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict John 
R. Oneal Bruce Russett Vol 36, Issue 4, pp. 423 - 442 First Published July 1, 1999 
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interdependence which will be a useful control variable in my own research 
design. They also show that there is no evidence that asymmetric trade 
increases conflict as was previously thought. Ultimately they establish that trade 
has a pronounced effect on conflict between contiguous countries; their model 
found that one standard deviation increase in the trade-to-GDP ratio lowers the 
likelihood of conflict for a contiguous dyad by 38%. Their design includes a 
number of additional controls, many of which also appear in Katherine Barbieri’s 
earlier work4  which will be discussed in greater detail below. Their results show 
the importance of controlling for contiguity because they found such a significant 
effect between contiguous countries, but not as large of an effect for other dyads 
regardless of geographic proximity.  
Stuart Bremer’s "Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of 
interstate war, 1816-1965" (1992) focuses not on trade, but on the conditions 
surrounding trade between states. For example he argues that trade between 
geographically close countries will increase the likelihood of conflict more than 
trade with countries that are further removed from one another. He also finds that 
advanced economies are more likely to go to war with a less developed country5. 
An interesting conclusion he draws in this article is the effects of what he calls 
“power base measures” such as steel production, fuel consumption, area, and 
population of the countries in question. He argues that when these measures are 
                                               
4  Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. “TRADING DATA: Evaluating 
our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(5): 471-491. 
5 Bremer, Stuart A. "Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816-
1965." Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (1992): 309-341 
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relatively equal between countries, there is a very good chance of conflict. 
Bremer also notes the importance of contiguity, pointing out that it should be 
controlled for in any research dealing with war. 
Contrary to Bremer’s argument, I argue that trade itself should decrease 
conflict because of economic incentives. Bremer uses trade as an indicator of 
how closely bound countries are and theorizes that the power imbalances that 
stem from one country having greater trade leverage over the other will drive 
conflict. Bremer does not control for asymmetric trade which important to my 
model for accounting for economic imbalances. Instead, Bremer emphasizes 
political power by controlling for advanced economies or major power status. 
However, it is a good model for looking at the effects of economic 
interdependence on conflict and gets at the heart of the power imbalances that 
can stem from trade. Bremer’s discussion on “power base measures” justifies 
some of the control variables included in the model developed here.   
Contrary to Bremer, James Morrow’s "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" 
(1999)6 looks at the mechanisms behind why trade should have an effect on 
conflict and puts forth several theories for why high levels of trade between 
countries might reduce the likelihood of conflict. He touches on the commonly 
discussed theory found often in related literature that higher trade flows reduce a 
state's resolve to fight because they fear losing that trading partner and the 
                                               
6 Morrow, James D. "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 
(1999): 481-89. 
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revenue they gained from the relationship if war were to break out7. He finds that 
states with “good” relationships, defined as a low level of conflict, have much 
higher levels of dyadic trade than hostile countries, even finding that moving from 
poor relations to good relations can produce close to a 400% increase in trade8. 
This argument seemingly implies that it is not trade that influences the likelihood 
of conflict, but rather the opposite: the nature of relations between countries 
determines trade. Morrow posits that economic actors within countries arrange 
their trading activities to account for potential losses in revenue due to the 
outbreak of war. In this sense he argues that states pay the price of conflict in 
trade before wars even occur. Morrow places particular emphasis on situations 
where countries employ trade sanctions. Sanctions are a costly signal that show 
a state’s resolve and unwillingness to bend on an issue that ultimately can avoid 
wars. My project does not seek to account for the friendliness of relations 
between countries, although my case study will dig deeper into the relationship 
between trade and political relationships. Instead, my model attempts to isolate 
only the effect of trade revenue on conflict. I will try to control for the varying 
levels of relationships between countries that Morrow found had such a salient 
effect by controlling for alliances.  
The following research design incorporates several of the factors identified 
                                               
7  Morrow, James D. "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 
(1999): 481-89.   
8 Morrow, James D. "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 
(1999): 481-89.  
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by Katherine Barbieri’s book “The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?”9 
(2005). Barbieri’s research tests a number of hypotheses involving the effect of 
different facets of trade on peace. It also tests which aspects of trade have the 
greatest impact on promoting peace between states. She argues against what 
she terms “the unconditional liberal hypothesis” according to which trade 
promotes peace regardless of the nature and context of economic linkages. She 
also criticizes the “Commercial liberalism” approach which states that “the ability 
of trade to promote peace is contingent upon the nature of economic linkages 
because asymmetric dependence creates tensions which may lead to 
conflicts”10. Barbieri looks specifically at whether unequal trade increases the 
likelihood of conflict and whether asymmetric dependence creates tensions 
which may lead to conflict. In her extensive data she finds evidence to support 
both of these claims.  
Barbieri concludes that peace is more likely between states that are 
mutually dependent on each other through trade, which directly contradicts Oneal 
and Russett’s findings on economic interdependence. This difference highlights 
the importance of controlling for trade dependence, defined as the ratio of 
bilateral trade to GDP, between countries to avoid any intervening effects that 
might arise from this complicated variable. Her results systematically work 
through the various configurations of variables that make conflict more or less 
                                               
9 Barbieri, Katherine. 2005. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
10 Barbieri, Katherine. 2005. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
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likely with changes to trade. If one state’s dependence on trade with another is 
low, then it is unlikely that trade will restrain the state from pursuing conflict. For 
example, her large n model finds that states with symmetrical dependence are 
less likely to conflict while mutual interdependence will make states less likely to 
engage in militarized conflicts.  For the purposes of the following research 
design, the key points of Barbieri’s book were her measures for the control 
variables of contiguity, relative capabilities, and alliance commitments.  
 
Hypotheses 
 My analysis tests several hypotheses for the effect of various types of 
trade. Firstly, I hypothesize that general trade (measured as the total trade 
between countries in the dyad in USD) will decrease the likelihood of militarized 
interstate disputes. This hypothesis is similar to the traditional conversations on 
the effects of trade, according to which countries will be hesitant to lose revenues 
from profitable trade partners. Governments should be less likely to engage in 
conflict with those partners compared to partners that turn less profit. This 
hypothesis serves to test the hypothesis put forward by Barbieri and determine if 
her findings hold true for more modern examples and more specifically for trade 
in strategically important sectors. Barbieri’s data had some 160,000 observations 
making it relatively easy to find statistically significant effects whereas my data 
covers a more recent period from 1993-2009 and includes only conflicts in dyads 
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including the Russian Federation, totaling roughly around 500 observations. My 
main hypothesis is that fuel trade as distinct from other trade will decrease the 
likelihood of conflict while trade revenue excluding fuel trade will have no effect 
on the likelihood of conflict. This hypothesis seeks to separate out strategically 
significant trade from all trade to suggest that it is specific types of trade that 
affects the likelihood of conflict and not trade in general. It points to a key 
distinction between types of trade and addresses whether it is simply trade that 
affects conflict or only trade in particular goods. Lastly, my analysis will include 
several controls discussed at greater length below and take a second look at the 
effects of many of the control variables tested in the above literature to determine 
which of these variables have a significant effect on conflict.  
Research Design 
 My design is intended to test whether the likelihood of conflict between 
Russia and its trading partners is influenced by the amount of trade in strategic 
resources between the two countries. More specifically, I hypothesize that when 
revenues from oil and gas trade increase, the likelihood of conflict between two 
countries will decrease. More broadly, my thesis aims to shed light on the 
question of whether revenue gained from the exports in strategically significant 
sectors influence the likelihood a state will engage in a conflict. These questions 
will build on the current literature on how trade and various aspects of trade more 
generally can decrease the probability of interstate disputes.  
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 To begin simply, the unit of analysis will be the country year. The 
dependent variable in this model is a simple dichotomous measure for conflict. 
The variable is coded “1” if a conflict began between a dyad in a given year and 
“0” if it did not.  For instance, using this measurement, a given year can have 
multiple observations of conflict measured if the conflict occurred between 
different countries or are two distinct conflicts between a given dyad. It is 
measured in such a way that conflicts drawn out over a period of several years 
will only be counted once in the year of its onset. Because of this, the 
independent variables are all measured in the prior year to get at their effects on 
the dependent variable. In addition to the conflict variable which includes MIDs 
as well as lower levels of conflict such as trade disputes and sanctions, I also 
included the variable “MConflict” which has a higher threshold for conflict. This 
variable is also binary and coded “1” only if a militarized interstate dispute began 
in a given year and “0” if it did not. Having two separate conflict variables will 
allow me to address whether trade has an effect on simply conflicts defined by a 
range of non-militarized and militarized disputes between governments or if trade 
affects the likelihood of militarized disputes specifically.  
 My analysis tests my hypothesis for the case of Russia. This research 
aims to isolate the effect of strategically significant trade on conflict by focusing 
on Russia specifically. Russia was chosen partially because I find it to be one of 
the best cases for finding effects, but also because Russia’s interactions with its 
partners, specifically Ukraine, will provide valuable insight into my question on a 
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more detailed level. Additionally Russia is reemerging as a powerful economic 
and military force, I find it important to move away from Americentric world views 
and place a greater emphasis on how other powers interact with the world. The 
main independent variable is Russian revenues from oil and gas exports. 
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), crude petroleum is 
Russia’s top export; as a percentage of total trade, crude petroleum accounts for 
26% while fuel exports combined account for more than 46%11. Making up nearly 
half of total exports, fuel is easy to identify as a key sector in the Russian 
economy as well as a strategically significant resource. Trade is measured in two 
variables: the first being total trade measured in US millions of current dollars 
and the second variable isolates fuel trade and is measured in US thousands of 
current dollars. Using total trade will allow me to test conventional wisdom with 
my data, while the variable for fuel trade will test for the effects of this specific 
type of trade which I have identified as being strategically significant on the 
likelihood of conflict.  
 Given that there are many factors that influence the likelihood of conflict, 
it is imperative that the model control for a wide array of independent variables. 
For the sake of clarity, the equations for the control variables are collected in 
Table 1 below. 
 Interdependence seeks to control for the importance of particular trade 
                                               
11 AJG Simoes, CA Hidalgo. The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for 
Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (2011) 
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relationships because those relationships that are most intertwined and politically 
salient will likely have a negative effect on the likelihood of conflict regardless of 
oil and gas trade. Controlling for trade interdependence is particularly important 
as a previous study done by John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett found economic 
interdependence actually makes conflict between two states more likely12. My 
research question seeks to find the effect of trade in general so I need to control 
for this effect.  
Table 1 also includes the equation for trade asymmetry; this variable is 
linked very closely to the variable for trade interdependence, but it is important to 
make asymmetry distinct. Countries with a high level of interdependence should 
have fairly symmetrical trade as both countries will rely on trade from the other. 
However, the key scenario that this variable aims to control is when one country 
in the dyad has the upper hand in trade. A good example of this would be the 
relationship between Russia and Belarus; Belarus imports a large percentage of 
their goods from Russia, but Russia is not dependent on trade with Belarus. 
Such leverage would make it far more difficult for Belarus to engage in conflict 
with Russia as their economy would be hurt significantly while Russia would bear 
little economic costs. In situations like these, we would expect countries like 
Belarus that have an asymmetrical dependence on another country to attempt to 
avoid conflict at all costs, regardless of trade.  
                                               
12 Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict John 
R. Oneal Bruce Russett Vol 36, Issue 4, pp. 423 - 442 First Published July 1, 1999 
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The equation for determining the capability ratio is also collected below in 
Table 1. This measure seeks to control for the varying capabilities of countries in 
the dyad that may make conflict more or less likely regardless of trade. To 
measure this I will use each country’s Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) score and take into consideration Bremer’s “power base measures” as 
discussed above. The capability control will control for varying military capacities 
between countries. To use Belarus as an example again, Belarus spends far less 
on its military than Russia and has much lower levels of steel and iron 
production, a metric typically associated with a country’s ability to wage war. In 
this scenario, Belarus would again seek to avoid conflict at all costs regardless of 
trade; therefore controlling for this is necessary to get at the true effects of my 
variable of interest.  
The dichotomous controls are far simpler to define and are therefore 
absent from Table 1. The first of this type of control is the dummy variable for 
contiguity. This controls for whether the two countries in the dyad are contiguous 
or not as countries that border each other are traditionally considered to be more 
likely to engage in conflict with one another. This variable is coded “1” if the 
country is contiguous with Russia and “0” if it is not. The control for alliances is 
another dummy variable that controls for whether the two countries in the dyad 
have a mutual defense pact or not. Similarly it is coded “1” if a country has 
signed a mutual defense pact with Russia or has a security agreement (for 
example, membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is coded as “1” in this 
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measure) and “0” if it has not. Lastly the model includes a dummy variable for 
NATO membership coded “1” if a country is a member of NATO and “0” if it is 
not. Similarly to the variable for alliances, this control seeks to separate out any 
effect that membership to NATO may have, given Russia’s hostile attitude 
towards the organization. 
 
Table 113 
Table 1: Control Variable Equations 
Trade Dependence 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠() +	𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠()𝐺𝐷𝑃( = 	𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒()𝐺𝐷𝑃(  
Trade Interdependence Lower of Dependenceij and Dependenceji 
Trade Asymmetry Higher Dependenceij and Dependenceji 
Capability Ratio 𝐿𝑁(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐶 ) 
 
 The research questions will be tested using a logistic regression analysis 
on STATA. Positive coefficients will be interpreted as the variable increasing the 
likelihood of conflict; conversely negative coefficients will be interpreted as 
decreasing the likelihood of conflict. A statistically significant finding of a negative 
coefficient of fuel trade would support my hypothesis that increased fuel trade 
decreases the probability of conflict. Results will be considered statistically 
significant at a P-value of less than .05, however any results with a P-value less 
                                               
13 Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict 
Debate Erik Gartzke Quan Li, Journal of Peace Research, Vol 40, Issue 5, pp. 553 - 571. First 
Published September 1, 2003 
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than .1 will merit discussion. The data for this research comes from multiple 
sources; the data and measurements for conflict come from the Correlates of 
War Project14 and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research15. 
Katherine Barbieri’s dataset16 contributes to data for conflict as well as trade. 
More information on the data sources for each variable can be found in the 
appendix. 
Equation 
 The equation presented below includes the controls variables discussed 
above and fixed effects for year. To test the hypotheses, the research design 
includes several different models to address various questions. The first model 
tests the hypothesis for all countries in the dataset using the less strict definition 
of conflict. This should be the best case scenario for finding a statistically 
significant effect. From this model I can analyze both the effect of trade in 
general and the effect of fuel. The second model tests the hypothesis for all 
countries using the “MConflict” variable. This applies the stricter definition to find 
if trade in general and trade in fuel effects the likelihood of militarized conflicts. 
Next, the following two models drop data from the United States, Canada, 
Afghanistan, China, and Japan, instead favoring a closer emphasis on Europe 
                                               
14 Ghosn, Faten, and Scott Bennett. 2003. Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident 
Data, Version 3.10. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org. 
15 “Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.” Heidelberger Institut Für 
Internationale Konfliktforschung, www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo1.html.  
16 Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set 
Codebook, Version 3.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org. 
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and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. These models aim to 
look closer at regional ties where trade levels are higher. Again these models test 
the hypothesis using both the conflict and MConflict variables.  
Lastly the final model tests the effect of non-fuel trade defined as fuel 
trade subtracted from total trade with the controls added. The last model is of 
particular interest as it isolates the effects of trade deemed non-strategically 
significant trade, defined as non-fuel trade, while controlling for the numerous 
variables explained above. This will be a key model for drawing meaningful 
conclusions about strategically significant trade and also for the effects of the 
control variables. 
 
Conflictcy  ~ Tradec(y-1)+ Fuelc(y-1) + Capabilityct + Interdependence + Asymmetry + 
Contiguity + Alliances + NATO + Year 
Discussion 
I aim to add another dimension to the work already done by Barbieri and 
others by looking at specific types of trade and its relationship to conflict. 
Understanding how trade affects interstate disputes is particularly important in 
the age of globalization with more countries becoming intertwined with one 
another through trade. In addition to this, trade has also been used to deter 
countries from pursuing conflict or to punish them for engaging in it through trade 
sanctions. Since the Iraq sanctions in 1990, trade sanctions have increasingly 
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become the knee jerk reaction of countries to punish leaders that step out of line. 
These developments of trade in political policy make research on how trade 
affects conflict particularly important if it is to be used as a coercive or retaliatory 
tool. It is necessary for leaders to understand how economic ties can spill over 
and influence foreign relations. 
In the specific case of Russia, understanding the effects of strategically 
significant trade is key for understanding Russian motivations in the near abroad. 
Particularly with the ongoing crisis between Russia and Ukraine, uncovering the 
role that oil and gas trade plays in the likelihood of interstate disputes will shed 
light on an important dimension of this conflict. Any findings on this question, 
whether they support or contradict my hypotheses, will have implications for how 
foreign policy decisions on Russia should be formulated. If high levels of oil and 
gas trade does decrease the likelihood of conflict, this will call into question how 
sanctions against Russia have been conceived. In addition, this finding would 
add to the understanding of why sanctions have been largely unsuccessful in 
ending the Ukraine conflict and if they truly will be effective over a long period of 
time as experts have argued.  
In sum, answering the question of how strategically significant trade 
effects conflict can be far more useful than simply looking at the effects of trade 
in general. Separating out this particular dimension of interstate trade will allow 
for more targeted foreign policy decisions and can aid in making educated policy 
that seeks to punish states effectively, but also to formulate policy that aims to 
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mitigate conflict.  
Results 
Table 2: Logistic Regression of All Data on Conflict 
 (1) 
VARIABLES conflict 
  
Total trade 0.00100 
 (0.000923) 
Fuel trade -0.00151 
 (0.00353) 
GDP 0.000137** 
 (5.91e-05) 
Contiguity 0.675** 
 (0.291) 
alliance -0.570* 
 (0.344) 
Capability -0.0235 
 (0.110) 
Asymmetry -0.0981 
 (0.0774) 
Dependence -4.371 
 (4.440) 
NATO -0.637* 
 (0.347) 
Year 0.0310 
 (0.0291) 
Constant -63.15 
 (58.05) 
  
Observations 484 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: dependent variable is the lower threshold  
definition of conflict using all data 
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Using logistic regression on the broadest definition of conflict I find neither trade 
as a whole, nor trade in strategically significant fuels have a statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of conflict. The first model which tests the 
effect of total trade and fuel trade on the broader definition of conflict using all 
countries in the dataset finds no evidence to support my hypothesis that 
increases in fuel trade will decrease the likelihood of conflict. The interesting 
finding from this model is that contiguity significantly increases the likelihood of 
conflict with Russia, specifically contiguous partners run a greater likelihood of 
conflict with Russia than non-contiguous trading partners. The model also finds 
that increases in GDP marginally increases the likelihood of conflict; the effect is 
small with each 1,000 USD increase in GDP increasing the likelihood of conflict 
by only a modest .01%, but the effect is statistically significant at a P value of 
.021. The following regression maintains the same control variables, but changes 
the dependent variable to a narrower definition of conflict that draws data solely 
from the Correlates of War MIDS dataset.  
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of All Data on MIDs 
 (1) 
VARIABLES MConflict 
  
Total trade 0.00226* 
 (0.00136) 
Fuel trade -0.0102 
 (0.00898) 
GDP 0.000114 
 (7.24e-05) 
Contiguity 0.755** 
 (0.349) 
Alliance -0.673 
 (0.427) 
Capability 0.000918 
 (0.135) 
Asymmetry -0.0496 
 (0.0879) 
Dependence -10.20 
 (6.359) 
NATO -1.072** 
 (0.419) 
Year -0.0440 
 (0.0370) 
Constant 86.58 
 (73.81) 
  
Observations 484 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: dependent variable is the MIDs 
definition of conflict using all data 
 
 
 
With this definition of conflict, contiguity remains statistically significant, 
however GDP is no longer a significant variable. The most notable shift is the 
change in the NATO variable. With the narrower conflict definition, NATO 
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membership becomes a significant variable at a P value of .011. Contrary to 
contiguity which strongly increases likelihood of conflict, membership in NATO 
decreases likelihood as conventional wisdom would suggest. This finding raises 
the question of how much of this is due to contiguity still. No country that shares 
a border with Russia is a member of NATO and the model has shown that 
contiguity raises the probability of conflict. Thus it makes sense that NATO 
membership should decrease likelihood of conflict. This model also finds no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that total trade or fuel trade has any effect on 
likelihood of conflict in Russia’s relationships with its trade partners in the time 
frame studied. 
 The following graph digs deeper into the effect of contiguity on the variable 
MConflict.  
 
Table 4: Adjusted Predictions of Contiguity on MIDs for All Data 
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Holding all other variables at their means, the contiguity variable finds that 
being contiguous increases probability of conflict by roughly 7%. This table and 
the following model both use the MIDS definition of conflict model. The next table 
shows the variable for NATO membership instead with all other variables held 
equal; this table finds that being a member of NATO decreases the likelihood of 
conflict by a little more than 10%.  
 
Table 5: Adjusted Predictions of NATO on MIDs for All Data 
 
 
 
The above analyses consider all data collected from a variety of states 
around the world and so to look at more targeted claims I have also split the 
analysis into regional models. The following models drop data from the United 
States, Canada, Afghanistan, China, and Japan, instead favoring a closer 
emphasis on Europe and CIS countries.  
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Table 6: Logistic Regression of European Data on Conflict 
 (1) 
VARIABLES conflict 
  
Total trade -0.0344 
 (0.0348) 
Fuel trade 0.000609 
 (0.00464) 
GDP 0.000358 
 (0.000342) 
Contiguity 0.799** 
 (0.375) 
alliance -0.429 
 (0.419) 
Capability 0.0431 
 (0.224) 
Asymmetry -1.760 
 (1.772) 
Dependence 24.52 
 (36.75) 
NATO -0.781* 
 (0.401) 
Year 0.0566 
 (0.0346) 
Constant -114.8* 
 (69.12) 
  
Observations 409 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: dependent variable is the lower threshold  
definition of conflict dropping data  
from the United States, Canada,  
Afghanistan, China, and Japan 
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Focusing on a narrower set of countries increases the effect of contiguity 
on likelihood of conflict. Shown in the following graph, being contiguous with 
Russia increases the probability by 10%. Again, however, trade of any sort has 
no statistically significant effect. NATO membership also has a statistically 
significant effect of decreasing the likelihood of conflict.  
 
Table 7: Adjusted Predictions of Contiguity on Conflict 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression of European Data on MIDs 
 (1) 
VARIABLES MConflict 
  
Total trade 0.00789 
 (0.0650) 
Fuel trade -0.00605 
 (0.0133) 
GDP -6.52e-05 
 (0.000538) 
Contiguity 0.959** 
 (0.460) 
alliance -0.244 
 (0.516) 
Capability -0.123 
 (0.279) 
Asymmetry -1.533 
 (2.367) 
Dependence -53.17 
 (51.82) 
NATO -1.044** 
 (0.483) 
Year -0.0442 
 (0.0418) 
Constant 87.50 
 (83.56) 
  
Observations 409 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: dependent variable is the MIDs  
definition of conflict dropping data  
from the United States, Canada,  
Afghanistan, China, and Japan 
 
 
Using the narrower definition of conflict in this limited set of countries has 
a similar effect as in the full dataset. Contiguity remains a statistically significant 
variable as well as NATO membership with a P value of .031. Being a NATO 
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member decreases the probability of conflict with Russia by nearly 10%.  
 
Table 9: Adjusted Predictions of NATO on MIDs 
 
 
In the interest of thoroughness I limited the data once again, this time 
excluding CIS countries and focusing only on Europe. This model did not yield 
any particularly groundbreaking results as it followed the same pattern of 
contiguity being the only statistically significant variable. Overall these models 
have all shown no statistically significant effects for either total trade or trade in 
fuel specifically. Therefore there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
increases in fuel trade will decrease the likelihood of conflict.  
Finally the following model tests for the effect of non-fuel trade as 
separated from total trade on conflict defined as only militarized interstate 
disputes (“MConflict”).  
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Table 10: Logistic Regression of All Data on MIDs using non-fuel trade 
variable  
 (1) 
VARIABLES MConflict 
   
Non-fuel trade 0.00279* 
 (0.00156) 
Contiguity 0.717** 
 (0.344) 
Alliance -0.707* 
 (0.410) 
Capability -0.0258 
 (0.113) 
Asymmetry -0.0162 
 (0.0866) 
Dependence -12.64* 
 (7.235) 
NATO -0.973** 
 (0.403) 
Year -0.0676** 
 (0.0326) 
Constant 133.9** 
 (65.22) 
  
Observations 481 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: this model uses the MIDs 
definition of conflict on all data 
 
 
 
First it would be prudent to discuss the major differences between this 
model and the previous ones. As outlined in the above research design P-values 
of greater than .05 are not a high enough bar for me to consider statistically 
significant, however STATA does note those results with a single asterisk as 
seen above. This model finds that non-fuel trade is statistically significant, this 
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would be an interesting result as it seems to suggest that while fuel trade, which I 
have identified as being strategically significant trade, does not have an effect on 
conflict, trade outside of this sector does. However, running this same model with 
the addition of the fuel trade variable finds that this level of statistical significance 
disappears and so I conclude that this is not a robust model. This model also 
finds that alliances and economic dependence are statistically significant 
variables at a P-value of less than .1. However, adding the fuel trade variable 
also gets rid of any level of significance for dependence, although the statistical 
significance remains for alliances. Finally this model finds that NATO 
membership and Contiguity are statistically significant at my threshold of a P-
value less than .05. This result is consistent with prior findings that do not include 
the variable for non-fuel trade.  
 I also ran this model using the lower threshold definition of conflict and 
found no statistical significance for non-fuel trade. Additionally the only variable 
statistically significant at a P-value of less than .05 was contiguity while alliance 
was significant at a P-value of less than .1.   
Case Study 
Given that the quantitative portion of this study found no relationship 
between trade, be it general trade or fuel trade, and conflict it is necessary to 
look towards a case study to see how the variables interact. The results did 
however find that contiguity had the greatest effect on likelihood of conflict which 
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is consistent with O’Neal and Russett’s findings. In their much larger sample, 
they found that contiguity had a large effect on the likelihood of conflict which 
suggests that geopolitics may play more of a role than pure economic 
calculations. Bremer also found that conflict is more likely occur between 
advanced economies and developing countries. By his definition of both 
advanced and developing economies, the case of Ukraine and Russia would fit 
with this theory, however there is much more at play than simply economic 
development levels, which is what this case study aims to elaborate on.  
This case study represents one of the most prominent examples of conflict 
in the sample, additionally it is consistent with my findings on contiguity. From 
this case study, I hope to dig deeper into the role of fuel on conflict and add to 
the complex question of trade’s effect on conflict through mixed methods. The 
main research design outlined above looks for the large scale effects in an 
attempt to be generalizable to trade and strategically significant trade outside of 
the case of the Russian Federation. The second part of my thesis is a case study 
of the 2009 gas shut off where, on January 1st, Russia shut off gas supplies to 
Europe through Ukraine in punishment for Ukraine’s alleged 600 million USD 
debt to Gazprom17. However similar conditions were met in 1998 when Ukraine 
owed an even larger, 900 million USD debt to Gazprom, however no conflict 
broke out. This case study argues that it is not fuel trade alone that causes 
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conflict, but rather the increasing politicization of the energy sector in Russia and 
the use of economics as a cover for geopolitical strategy.  
Ukraine is a key trading partner with Russia where concerns over fuel 
consumption and transport have been the underlying source of political conflict 
and contestation. As early as 2006 Gidadhubli wrote that, under the Putin 
government, the desire was not just to maximize profit, but to reassert the 
country’s powerful position on the world stage18.  This interpretation of trade 
relationships suggests that the country’s lucrative oil trade may do more than 
simply enrich the oligarch class, but rather inform foreign relations to some 
extent. Unlike the majority of conflicts recorded in the large n dataset featuring an 
additional 30 countries, trade in fuel constantly hangs over Russian-Ukrainian 
relations. Ukraine is an invaluable transit country for Russia that, despite 
initiatives to construct pipelines that bypass Ukraine entirely, in the near future 
will not wane in significance. In addition to the incentives for friendly relations 
simply on the basis of ensuring smooth economic activity, Ukraine is also an 
important border country that factors significantly into Russian calculations of 
national security and the security of the Eurasian countries. The significance of 
Ukraine culturally, historically, and geopolitically to Russia cannot be overstated. 
At the conference for Politics and Economics of the DCFTA and Eurasian 
Spaces, Andrey Makarychev noted that “Ukraine plays a pivotal role in 
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determining the contours of Europe and Eurasia”. Understanding the dynamics 
between Russia and Ukraine is an essential foundation for understanding 
Russian relations with the wider world.  
The case of the 2009 gas crisis is one of the clearest examples of 
economic concerns sparking a political conflict. The conflict was caused by 
Ukraine’s outstanding debts to Gazprom as well as alleged gas theft during 
transit. This case seemingly fits well with the hypothesis that decreases in 
strategically significant trade (in this case is the form of debt rather than simply 
reduced import) should increase the likelihood of conflict. However, an in depth 
look at this case as well as similar conditions experienced in 1998 that did not 
lead to a crisis shows that this was not simply a cost benefit calculation, but 
rather that the 2009 gas crisis was politically motivated in response to the pro-
Western president Yushchenko.  
In the early years after Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the attitude 
of leadership in terms of economics could be summed up by a fear of falling 
under Russian control once more. The two closely intertwined economies, once 
forced apart, meant that Ukraine had to cope with sudden changes to its 
currency and taxation system. Fear of becoming economically dependent on 
Russia, thus losing an important facet of its sovereignty, led Ukraine away from 
close trade with Russia and encouraged the adoption of the Ukrainian Hryvnia 
over the Russian Ruble.  
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The 1994 election of Leonid Kuchma shifted relations with Russia from 
idealist and nationalist oriented to what was termed economic pragmatism19. 
Kuchma himself came from an industrial background, having served as the 
manager of the largest missile plant in Europe and the president of the Ukrainian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs20. Under Kuchma, the economic elite 
class emerged more fully in Ukraine, creating the foundations of an oligarchy and 
significantly altering relations with Russia based on economic incentive.  
 The pragmatic approach to relations was widely popular among Soviet 
experts who viewed business interests as the bridge to warmer relations in face 
of the chilly economic isolation that took hold in independent Ukraine’s infancy21. 
Chairman of the Russian union of Industrialists, Arkadii Volsky, was a vocal 
proponent of constructive pragmatism, arguing good relations between Russia 
and Ukraine were imperative for the survival of the business community in both 
states22. Strategic economic resources in Ukraine meant that eventually 
leadership had to embrace Russia as a trading partner. Closer ties with Russia 
led to an increased role for non-state actors, namely businessmen who made 
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their wealth off of these resources during early privatization, in foreign policy23. 
This blend of government and private business interests is known as “complex 
interdependence” that, according to Keohane and Nye, occur most often with 
states where old economic and environmental issues serve as the focus of 
interaction between the two sides24.  
Under Yeltsin, the period of economic decline in Russia following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was viewed as the result of his foreign policy 
weakness25, quickly and inextricably binding the two as Russia grew as an 
independent country. Vladimir Putin came to power in a country where foreign 
policy success was measured against economic growth and both metrics 
continue to feed off of one another. In his first years in the presidency, Putin’s 
main aim was to stem the erosion of power that the oligarchs has seized under 
Yeltsin and the rush of privatization; his strategy to accomplish this was to regain 
state control of the “commanding heights” of the economy - particularly the 
energy sector26. This is the time period in which the foundation was laid for the 
future disputes and crises between Ukraine and Russia that were predominantly 
founded on concerns over energy trade in oil and natural gas. This shift in policy 
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to favor the energy sector and to place more emphasis on the economy at large 
marks also a change in foreign policy strategy that contributed to why a gas crisis 
occurred in 2009, but not in 1998.  
 By the mid-90s, the rapid shift in economic structure and the increasingly 
privatized strategic sectors led to a proliferation of corruption in the Ukrainian 
government. The most notable effect of the growing oligarchic class was the 
barter system used to trade “goods” that were often tied to political favors to 
Russia in return for energy27. Intertwined with this came the concept of a national 
bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie focused on creating protections for the 
national economy to shield it from growing Russian influence, involving political 
and business actors in joint ventures to bring these two spheres of society closer 
together for the common good of Ukraine, and emphasizing the importance of 
national capital over foreign capital28.  
 Business interactions in Ukraine, as with many wary post-Soviet states, 
were still complicated by the question of whether defense and sovereignty issues 
are incompatible with economic growth and reintegration with some of the old 
networks of the Soviet Union. Following separation, Russia continued to be 
Ukraine’s primary energy provider, main creditor, and largest export market with 
Ukraine importing 90% of its oil and more than 60% of its gas from Russia 
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annually in the 1990s29. 
The total trade in 1996 amounted to 17.1 billion USD and 15.1 billion USD 
in 1997. Of this boom in trade, however, by January 1997 Kiev owed a debt of 
8.8 billion USD to Russia and by March 1998, 900 million USD was owed to 
Gazprom alone30.  
 In 1998 Ukraine’s debt to Gazprom was significantly higher than in 2009, 
however Russia was not concerned with collecting on these debts in 1998. In 
Russia, 1998 marked the beginning of an economic crisis; In June oil prices 
dropped to nine dollars a barrel which caused Russia to default on a number of 
its debts31. By August the financial crisis led Russia to freeze all economic 
activity in Ukraine32, meanwhile in Ukraine 1998 to 2002 marked the first period 
of economic stability since gaining independence. This was a time when Russia 
had great incentive to collect on Ukraine’s debts, but no aggressive actions were 
taken. This inaction is best explained by the strides forward Russian-Ukrainian 
relations had taken prior to 1998 which continued to improve even during the 
financial crisis.  
A year earlier, in May of 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a Friendship 
Agreement that set both countries on an equal level on international stage and 
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formally acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty and the inviolability of borders33. 
Article 634, in fact, included a pledge by both sides stating neither would take any 
action that would undermine the security interests of the other. The leadership of 
both countries remained committed to rebuilding relations as independent 
countries and coordinating policies in a way that was mutually agreeable.  
Following the economic crash in 1998, the IMF increased pressure on 
Ukraine to loosen restrictions on privatization35.  On February 10th, 1998 Ukraine 
and Russia signed a 10-year agreement on economic cooperation which officially 
opened Ukrainian privatization to Russian investors. That year the Ukrainian 
budget was set at 11 billion USD with only 600 million of that expected to come 
from domestic investors into privatization while Russian investments accounted 
for 1 billion36.  
The more widespread privatization efforts contributed to the “perk” culture 
wherein loyal economic elites gained perks in the redistribution of economic 
resources in return for parliamentary support in the 1999 presidential election37. 
In 2000 Ukraine’s economy grew by 5.8%38 coupled with a large-scale operation 
led by the Ukrainian state property fund to sell state property and state-owned 
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majority shares in important strategic enterprises such as industry, military, and 
energy. At this point in time Ukraine was importing ⅔ of its total gas usage from 
Russia, half of which was taken as payment for Russia’s use of Ukraine’s transit 
pipelines to Europe. In terms of Russia’s pipeline usage, 90% of gas exports to 
Europe had to go through Ukraine39 making it an essential state for facilitating 
Russian exports. In 2000 Ukraine was also outright the largest buyer of Russian 
gas and the second largest buyer of crude oil. If Ukraine was not an important 
trade partner for transit rights alone, then it certainly earned that title as one of 
Russia’s largest export markets.  
During this time of economic growth for Ukraine and the increasingly 
interdependent economic condition, the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign 
began protesting the brutalities of the regime and numerous allegations of 
corruption - specifically related to the perceived favoritism of Russian business40. 
This period marked a tenuous era for Ukrainian sovereignty and its pursuit of 
democracy, the mix of economic growth and a perilous position domestically for 
the president led the regime to pursue closer relations with their most dominant 
trade partner. This move is best represented by the record 18 meetings that 
Kuchma took with Russian President Putin between 2000 and 200241, far more 
than any other leader over the same time period. With Kuchma facing a 
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challenge to his legitimacy at home, the Ukrainian government continued to link 
economically with Russia. In February of 2001 Russia and Ukraine agreed to 
reconnect their national electricity grid which significantly reduced electricity 
costs for Ukraine42. The government used these recovered energy revenues to 
funnel money into failing social programs to address the problems of public 
health, poverty, and social insurance schemes43. During 2001, the Ukrainian 
economy grew by 9.2%44 leading the Russian Office of Statistics to name 
Ukraine as the country with the most promising economic indicators out of the 
CIS countries45. In the same year Ukrainian exports to Russia accounted for 
27.2% of total exports while imports from Russia made up a massive 38% of all 
imports with the trade turnover between the countries amounting to 9.1 billion46.  
Politically, Kuchma was able to sustain his position until the 2004 
presidential election largely due to the economic growth created from 
increasingly close relations with Russia. In May 2001 Kuchma forced out his 
Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko due to pressure from oligarchs who were 
economically threatened by Yushchenko’s new energy revenue policy that 
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sought to reduce the corruption of the energy industry47. Yushchenko 
represented a new voice of liberal, European oriented politics in Ukraine. His 
actions as Prime Minister were interpreted by Russia to be hostile to their 
interests in Ukraine. Yushchenko served for only 18 months as Prime minister 
and his ousting was publicly opposed by 52% of the population48. Ihor Bakai, the 
chairman of the Ukrainian Naftogaz and a member of the Verkhovna Rada made 
a statement in 2002 pointing out that Ukraine’s oligarchs owed their money to 
Russia through the legal or illegal import of energy supplies49.  
In 2002 Kuchma made clear his desire to bring Ukraine politically closer to 
Russia in addition to his moves to link the two economically. In May of that year 
he pledged to join the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), a move Ukrainians 
were skeptical of upon first offer when the economic union was created due to 
the inevitability of Russian influence into Ukrainian markets. However the new 
wave of economic growth in the late 90s and early 2000s that was widely seen to 
be brought on by increasing trade with Russia warmed public opinion to the idea 
of inclusion. By July Ukraine was officially upgraded from observer status to a full 
member of the EEC50.  
Coming out of a long period of sustained economic growth at the cost of 
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massive corruption, the 2004 presidential election and subsequent Orange 
Revolution it ignited exemplifies the point that the economic success of a country 
means little to the people if they still find their government to be unaccountable 
and self-serving. Rather than recount the events of the election and the spark of 
mass protest, it is perhaps more interesting to look at the after effects. In 2004 
joint work between Russia and Ukraine began to expand the capacity of natural 
gas through Ukraine by 30 BCM (billion cubic meters)51. Following the upheaval, 
in early 2005 the EU granted Ukraine market economy status52. A clear signal 
from both European leaders and the newly elected president Yushchenko that 
Ukraine would benefit from a more diversified economy less dependent on 
Russia imports and exports. The upgraded status improved access to EU 
markets and also simplified the visa regime making it easier for Ukrainians to 
seek work in the EU. By 2008, NATO pledged the eventual admittance of 
Ukraine into NATO during the Bucharest Summit53. This move is by far the 
starkest difference between the legacy of Kuchma and Yushchenko. NATO 
membership has historically been and continues to be one of Russia’s greatest 
fears for countries they consider to be in their sphere of influence.  
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2009 Gas Crisis 
Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, Russian strategy for relations with 
Ukraine became distinctly aimed at exerting economic pressure on Ukraine to 
“punish” leadership. This took the form of several energy price disputes resulting 
in the 2009 energy crisis that was made possible by increasing government 
control of energy firms in Russia. By 2006 analysts had concluded that the main 
energy firms of Rosnergo, Transneft, Rosneft, and Gazprom could not operate 
independent of the state, with Gazprom being the most obvious example of state 
intervention with the Russian government owning 51% of shares54. Following the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the accession of anti-Russian president 
Yushchenko, energy policy began to reflect the colder relations between the two 
governments. In January of 2006 Gazprom increased the price of oil to Ukraine 
from $50 per thousand cubic meters to $230, more than most other European 
nations paid despite Ukraine formerly having favorable prices due to its 
importance as a transit country55. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference Putin 
gave a speech in which he declared that Russia will not have its foreign policy 
dictated by the west, rather it would be dictated by Russia’s national interests56. 
Perhaps the most succinct explanation of Russia’s foreign policy to date, this 
speech signaled Russia would not abide by normative pressures to keep 
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economic pursuits separate from political actions. In the same year, 69% of 
Russian gas exports went to Europe through Ukrainian pipelines making 
relations with Ukraine a key strategic interest57. As Europe would learn after 
2009, disruptions in Russia’s relationship with Ukraine could lead to a cold 
winter. 
During the period of 1998 to 2008 the GDP growth of Ukraine averaged 
7.2%, however the combined government and corporate debt of 105 billion in 
2008 led to experts branding Ukraine the most risky investment country in the 
world58. In part because of this large debt, in December of 2008 negotiations 
between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices collapsed. In the talks, Russia had 
insisted that gas prices paid by Ukraine should be doubled, while Ukraine rallied 
against such a large increase and threatened to raise transit fees in response59. 
On January 1, 2009 Russia cut off all gas supplies travelling through Ukraine; as 
a key transit country this shutdown left European consumer unable to import the 
majority of their gas needs. According to Gazprom, Ukraine owed more than 600 
million USD in penalties for late payments alone. The Kremlin added to the 
accusations, justifying the shut off by claiming Kiev had been siphoning off and 
stealing gas60.  
At the time of the crisis, 80% of all Europe’s gas imports from Russia went 
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through Ukraine61. Of those affected by the shut off, Bosnia, Macedonia, and 
Slovakia were all 100% dependent on Russian gas while countries like the Czech 
Republic were 80% dependent, Germany 42%, Poland 40%, Italy 28%, and 
France 24%62. Countries that had been largely supportive of Ukraine’s bid to join 
NATO were now being pressured by Russia indirectly.  
Shortly thereafter on January 18, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko 
helped to broker an agreement on gas prices with Russia to end the stalemate - 
an agreement that would later become even more politically contentious and find 
Tymoshenko jailed in 2011 for failing to act in Ukraine’s best interests among 
other accusations63. In the agreement, Russia received higher prices for gas, 
while Ukraine saw a small price hike in 2009 but were guaranteed price stability 
and favorable terms for the gas transit costs. The agreement was later 
renegotiated in April 2010 following pro-Russian president Yanukovych's 
election; the agreement, referred to as the Kharkiv Accords, allowed Russia to 
maintain high gas prices in addition to a number of political concessions including 
basing rights for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea64. The aftermath of the 
original gas agreement also found itself interwoven with the global financial crisis 
(GFC). In March 2009 the value of the Hryvnia to the dollar was 8, down from 4.5 
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in the summer of 200865. Similar to many of the European countries facing the 
impact of the GFC, Ukrainian imports fell by 40% with exports falling by 25%, 
while GDP fell 15% percent after a sustained period of growth. Notably the 
energy sector in Russia saw a much more modest decline than other sectors 
during the recession66. By 2010 Ukraine’s prices for gas through Gazprom were 
higher than almost all Western European states67. 
In this case, dispute over transit costs and policies regarding fuel trade 
sparked a political conflict that spilled over into Europe as well. The question 
here, and in the quantitative portion of this paper more broadly, is how much of 
this conflict is truly the result of a simple cost benefit analysis of the potential 
gains of the shutoff and how much of this was just convenient optics in order to 
effect a greater political change to meet goals outside of trade issues. In short, 
does trade and economic gain really matter as much as we think it does or was 
this simply another area susceptible to political maneuvering?  
Most notable is the Ukrainian response to this sudden economic downturn 
amid conflict with Russia. 2010 marked another presidential election and with the 
very real effects of the gas shut off and economic crisis still front and center in 
the national consciousness, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president. 
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Yanukovych found his base of support in the Eastern and Southern Regions of 
Ukraine, with his home region being in the East himself, and among those 
favoring closer ties with Russia. Because of the recent conflict there was a 
resurgence in those favoring friendly relations with Russia, not just in the East 
and South who traditionally have toed that line, but also from regions that were 
wary in 2004 because of the corruption of Kuchma’s regime that was associated 
heavily with Russian business interests. The ability of Yanukovych to ascend to 
the presidency despite the massive corruption scandal that enveloped his 2004 
campaign and sparked the Orange Revolution signals the enormous shift in 
Ukrainian politics in response to the gas crisis with Russia and the economic 
downturn. 
Theory suggests that trade should reduce the likelihood of conflict 
particularly as two economies become more interdependent. Following this 
theory, we should expect that Ukraine and Russia should be wary to conflict with 
one another due to the high level of trade between the two. In the case of the 
2009 gas crisis, economic concerns seem at the forefront and indeed are the 
spark that kicked off these political tensions; however, the outcome shows very 
strong political motivations rather than a pure reaction to economic conditions. It 
is increasingly difficult to pry apart economic and political motivations as the two 
naturally go hand in hand; however, the timing of the gas crisis and the 
conditions prior to the shut off and after it point to the move being politically 
calculated rather than a response to Ukraine’s alleged debts. In 1998, Ukraine 
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owed 900 million to Gazprom, a full 300 million more than it did in 2009 at the 
start of the gas crisis. The key differences in 1998 were Ukrainian leadership and 
Russian foreign policy. In 1998, then President Kuchma was willing to cooperate 
heavily with Russia, it was taking steps to join the EEC and in fact opened up 
privatization to Russian investors shortly after. Following the Orange Revolution 
where Yushchenko mobilized the public against the fraudulent election of Kremlin 
backed Viktor Yanukovych, President Yushchenko had made good on his 
campaign promises to move away from Russia and closer to Europe. Indeed 
Yushchenko took steps to signal Ukraine’s interest in joining both NATO and the 
EU, moves that would be intolerable to Russia as it would allow Western powers 
to encroach on their sphere of influence. Aside from marked changes in the 
attitudes of leadership, by the 2009 crisis Russia’s policy of using economic 
leverage to achieve political concessions had already been outlined and 
employed, though this crisis proves to be one of the greatest examples of this 
strategy in action. Upon coming to power, Putin made clear his goals to revitalize 
the energy sector and use economic strength as a tool for foreign policy success. 
Learning from the Yeltsin era of economic downturn and weakness abroad, Putin 
held fast in the belief that political victories could be earned through economic 
policy and a strong presence abroad would lead to economic growth.  
The election of a previously Kremlin backed presidential candidate 
Yanukovych to the presidency of Ukraine despite prior scandal shows that the 
aim of the Russian government in shutting off gas transit went much further than 
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simply negotiating for more favorable costs. Energy export and transit fees are 
the greatest tools Russia possesses for shaping Ukrainian politics in their favor. 
Economically Ukraine was in a very similar position in 1998 and 2009 vis-a-vis 
their energy debts to Russia; if a trade dispute was genuinely at the core of the 
2009 gas crisis then we should have seen a conflict in 1998 as well. Because 
Russia did not seem to be concerned with the larger debt owed in 1998, there 
must have been other variables that contributed to Russia’s reaction to Ukraine’s 
debt in 2009. The most stark difference is the attitude of Ukraine’s president; in 
1998 president Kuchma was willing to cooperate with Russia which provided 
incentive to avoid a larger conflict over the debt, however in 2009 president 
Yushchenko was making overtures to the west and moving away from Russia’s 
sphere of influence which afforded Putin the opportunity to use Russia’s 
economic leverage in the energy sector to affect political change in line with 
Russia’s national interests.   
 
Conclusion 
These findings show that in my case of interest, i.e. dyadic relationships 
involving Russia from 1993-2009, trade does not have a significant effect on 
conflict. Furthermore trade in fuels had no statistically significant effects; this is a 
particularly notable conclusion in the case of Russian relations where fuels 
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including oil and coal make up the top 3 export products68 making it a substantial 
portion of the economy. This result suggests that economic concerns do not play 
as large a role in Russian foreign policy as previously assumed. The lack of a 
relationship between trade and conflict means that conflict is likely due to factors 
outside of a desire for Russian oligarchs and others in leadership to profit from 
energy revenues and thus we should expect that interdependent trade 
relationships will not have a strong effect of deterring conflict as relations 
continue to grow closer. This result builds on the in depth look at Russian-
Ukrainian relations by adding to the theory that even in conflicts ostensibly spark 
by economic concerns, disputes are typically underscored by political motivations 
and geopolitical calculations rather than economic cost-benefit analyses. 
In the context of this research design it would have been of particular 
interest to control for the Russian population within these dyads, however time 
and resource constraints made this a lofty goal that is certainly a key area to 
incorporate into future research of this area. For example, Russia's annexation of 
Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 was conducted under the guise of protecting the 
ethnic Russian population in the region. Indeed, Crimea was roughly 60% 
Russian according to a 2001 census, compared to the 24% Ukrainian 
population69. This is not a unique argument for the Russian government in 
justifying use of force abroad, therefore it can be theorized that states with larger 
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ethnic Russian population have a higher likelihood of conflict. The control 
variable for Russian émigrés would measure the ethnic Russian population of a 
country as a percentage of its total population. Where possible, this measure will 
include “ethnic Russians” defined as those with Russian ancestry who were born 
outside of Russia and also those born within Russia who have emigrated 
permanently who hold residence permits or citizenship in their new country of 
residence.  
Additionally I would include the variable for joint-democracy intends to 
control for the regime type of each state70. This control is measured using its 
score on the Polity scale to determine if the states in the dyad are both 
democracies or not. Traditional wisdom argues that two democratic states are 
less likely to engage in conflict with each other and thus this variable would 
isolate the effect of trade separate from the effects of regime type. My models did 
not include an interaction term which would have been beneficial to the study; 
this is another aspect I would consider adding when pursuing this topic further.  
In the future this research would benefit from an expansion of data; the 
data used in this paper is limited to 31 countries over a period of 17 years. Ideally 
I would like to expand on both the time period, extending it further past 2009, as 
well as the country list with the goal of collecting data on each of Russia’s trading 
partners. Perhaps the most notable exclusion is from the case study which did 
not cover the 2013 Maidan protests and the ongoing conflict between Russia and 
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Ukraine. While this particular conflict is consistent with my conclusion that 
geopolitical concerns outweigh economic claims, this conflict contains such a 
wide range of variables that my long-term case study could not do it justice. This 
is in fact a key conflict for my argument as it is a salient case of EU negotiations 
infringing on Russia’s “sphere of influence” and harming Russian attempts to 
foster a Eurasian Community to counter the EU. This is an area that holds great 
insight into Russian foreign policy strategy and will undoubtedly be a cornerstone 
for future research into the topic. Beyond that, research on trade and its 
relationship to conflict will continue to be an important issue as economies 
become more interdependent and increasingly reliant on individual suppliers 
such as the EU’s reliance on Russia for fuel which was the basis for this 
research. Because of this, it is essential to expand this type of research into trade 
in strategically significant sectors beyond countries relations with Russia, but also 
to dyadic relations between other countries. Fuel in particular is a key product 
that literature on the effect of trade would benefit from isolating; it has proven to 
be an attractive resource for intervention as well as a political tool of coercion. 
Research on trade must go beyond simply where the money moves to and from, 
but rather to include an emphasis on what products and resources are driving 
these trade flows.
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Appendix 
 
Raw data can be accessed here: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LwJVeKaqaYlbl9FQcNJ2ycFrexQ3qVkQ/view?usp=shari
ng  
 
Data Sources  
Conflict  Ghosen, Faten, and Scott Bennett. 2003.  Codebook for the 
Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incidence Data, Version 3.10. 
Online: http://correlatesofwar.org  
 
“Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.” 
Heidelberger Institut Für Internationale Konfliktforschung, 
www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo1.html. 
 
Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshi Kobayashi. 2014. 
"The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES 
dataset." Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5): 541-
558. 
 
Total trade Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War 
Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0.  
 
Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. 
“TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding 
Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(5): 471-
491. 
 
Fuel Trade "World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)." World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS) | Data on Export, Import, Tariff, NTM. 
Accessed March 18, 2018.  
 
Oil Revenue "UN Comtrade | International Trade Statistics Database." United 
Nations. Accessed March 18, 2018.  
 
Alliances Gibler, Douglas M. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
CINC score Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). 
"Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 
1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed.) Peace, War, and Numbers, 
Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. Version 5.0 
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